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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT: EXCESSIVE FORCE AS
A PRISON CONDITION

I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a),
was enacted as a means to deter frivolous lawsuits by prisoners and to
discourage federal judges from micromanaging prison systems.1 Complaints
filed by prisoners had grown from 6,600 in 1975 to more than 39,000 in 1994.2
Congress noted that prisoners seemed to enjoy filing frivolous lawsuits.3 Some
of these suits included claims of insufficient storage locker space, a defective
haircut by a prison barber, the failure of prison officials to invite a prisoner to a
pizza party for a departing prison employee and being served chunky peanut
butter instead of the creamy variety.4 Frivolous inmate litigation costs the U.S.
taxpayers millions of dollars every year as a result of fighting these claims and
from delaying legitimate claims from being heard.5
A.

Importance of this Issue

The PLRA provides that a prisoner shall bring no action with respect to
prison conditions until all available administrative remedies have been
exhausted.6 Section 1997e(a) does not define the term “prison conditions.”
Prisoners have seen this as an end run opportunity to proceed directly to

1. 141 CONG. REC. S7498-01, S7525 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole);
141 CONG. REC. S14312-03, S14317 (daily ed. Sep. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen. Abraham); 141
CONG. REC. S14408-01, S14414 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole). “These
guidelines will work to restrain liberal Federal judges who see violation on constitutional rights in
every prisoner complaint and who have used these complaints to micromanage State and local
prison systems.” Id.
2. 141 CONG. REC. S7498-01, S7524 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
3. 141 CONG. REC. S7498-01, S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995); (statement of Sen. Kyl);
141 CONG. REC. S14408-01, S14418 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
“Jailhouse lawyers with little else to do are tying our courts in knots with an endless flood of
frivolous litigation.” Id.
4. 141 CONG. REC. S14408-01, S14413 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
5. 141 CONG. REC. S14312-03, S14316 (daily ed. Sep. 26, 1995) (statement of Sen.
Abraham). Thirty three States have estimated that Federal prisoner suits cost them at least $54.5
million annually. Id. The National Association of Attorneys General estimate the nationwide
costs at more than $81.3 million. Id.
6. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. 2001).
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federal court with their claims of excessive force. While most circuits have
seen through this and ordered the exhaustion requirement met, the Second
Circuit, however, has decided otherwise.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the case of Nussle v.
Willette. In Nussle, the Second Circuit held that the PLRA exhaustion
requirement does not encompass claims of excessive force. The Second
Circuit defined “prison conditions” as those referring to “circumstances
affecting everyone in the area” and held that Nussle’s beating was a single or
momentary matter and was not a prison condition, thus he could go directly to
federal court. The Supreme Court, reversing the Second Circuit, held that the
PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all inmate suits regardless of their
claim.
This comment is in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Nussle. It
will be argued that this decision has effectively foreclosed any prisoner’s
attempt to bypass administrative grievance procedures and take the claim
directly to court. The Supreme Court’s decision not only resolved the Circuit
split with respect to the PLRA excessive force issue, it also left no doubt that
an inmate must exhaust any and all available administrative remedies.
B.

Summary of Comment

Section II of the comment will describe the development and background
of the PLRA. Section III will examine the circuit split in detail. The split is
one-sided, with the Third, Sixth, Seventh and Eleventh Circuits holding that a
claim of excessive force is a “prison condition” under the PLRA. Only the
Second Circuit has held otherwise. Section IV will analyze the Supreme
Court’s holding in Nussle v. Willette. As support for the Court’s decision, the
case history and text of the PLRA will be analyzed. The legislative intent
behind the amended act will also be examined. Lastly, the implications of the
Court’s ruling in Nussle will be discussed.
Section V is the conclusion statement.
II. BACKGROUND & DEVELOPMENT OF THE PLRA
Generally, when asserting a claim of excessive force, a prisoner will allege
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that a prison official has violated his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.7

7. 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1994). Section 1983 reads in part: “Every person who, under color of
any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subject, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person
within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.” Id.
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Section 1983 can be traced back to post-Civil War legislation.8 In 1871,
Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act as a means of protecting Southern
African-Americans from reprisals during reconstruction.9 In the 1960’s, the
United States Supreme Court determined that citizens could sue local and state
government officials under § 1983 when certain actions or policies fell below
constitutional standards.10 Eventually, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
prisoners could bring claims under § 1983 as a means to challenge the
unconstitutional conditions of their confinement.11
A.

Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act

In 1980, Congress enacted the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act
(CRIPA) and codified it as 42 U.S.C. § 1997. CRIPA authorized the U.S.
Attorney General and the federal courts to certify state administrative
grievance mechanisms and gave the courts discretion to require exhaustion of
these mechanisms before the claim could reach federal court. Section 1997e(a)
of CRIPA provided the discretionary mechanism by which courts could require
a prisoner to exhaust state administrative remedies before asserting a § 1983
claim.12 One goal of CRIPA was to resolve prisoner complaints on their
merits, short of litigation; however, that goal was not achieved because most
state prisons did not seek certification and were not encouraged by the
Attorney General or the federal courts to obtain certification.13
B.

Prison Litigation Reform Act

President Clinton signed the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) into
law on April 26, 1996. The PLRA was Congress’ attempt to reduce the
enormous amount of frivolous prisoner litigation burdening the federal courts

8. ROGER A. HANSON & HENRY W.K.DALEY, CHALLENGING THE CONDITIONS OF PRISONS
AND JAILS, A REPORT ON SECTION 1983 LITIGATION 12 (1995).

9. Id.
10. Id. at 13.
11. Id. at 13-14.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (1994) (amended 1996). Section 1997e(a) reads: “(1) Subject to
the provisions of paragraph (2), in any action brought pursuant to section 1983 of this title by an
adult convicted of a crime confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility, the court
shall, if the court believes that such a requirement would be appropriate and in the interests of
justice, continue such case for a period of not to exceed 180 days in order to require exhaustion of
such plain, speedy, and effective administrative remedies as are available. (2) The exhaustion of
administrative remedies under paragraph (1) may not be required unless the Attorney General has
certified or the court has determined that such administrative remedies are in substantial
compliance with the minimum acceptable standards promulgated under subsection (b) of this
section or are otherwise fair and effective.” Id.
13. HANSON & DALEY, supra note 8, at 40.
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and to suppress the micromanagement of prison systems by federal judges.14
The PLRA created major changes in 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) by requiring
prisoners to exhaust all available administrative remedies before bringing a
claim with respect to prison conditions.15 The PLRA changed § 1997e(a) in
three ways. First, § 1997e(a) originally only applied to § 1983 actions.16 The
amended section now applies to any federal claim with respect to prison
conditions.17 Second, the courts originally had discretion to require exhaustion
of administrative remedies. The courts were allowed to continue the action for
a maximum of 180 days. Under the PLRA, the court has absolutely no
discretion because the exhaustion requirement is mandatory. Third, the
amended section has eliminated the “plain, speedy and effective” language and
the certification process by the Attorney General or the court. Effectiveness of
administrative remedies is not an issue under the PLRA.
III. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
The current circuit court split is heavily weighted to one side. The Third,
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth and Eleventh Circuit courts hold that excessive
force is a prison condition for purposes of the PLRA, thus the prisoner must
exhaust administrative remedies before bringing a § 1983 claim.18 The Second
Circuit, relying on Webster’s Dictionary, stands alone in finding that excessive
force is not a prison condition, such that the prisoner may bypass
administrative remedies and proceed directly to federal court.19
A.

Circuits Finding Excessive Force to be a Prison Condition
1. Third Circuit

Booth v. Churner is perhaps the most relevant and interesting case
concerning a claim of excessive force brought under the PLRA.20 Booth is

14. 141 CONG. REC. S14408-01, S14418 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
15. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. 2001). Section 1997e(a) now reads: No action shall be
brought with respect to prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal
law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” Id.
16. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
17. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
18. Booth v. Churner, 206 F.3d 289 (3rd Cir. 2000), aff’d, 532 U.S. 731 (2001); Wendell v.
Asher, 162 F.3d 887 (5th Cir. 1998); Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 1999); Smith v.
Zachary, 255 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2001); Garrett v. Hawk, 127 F.3d 1263 (10th Cir. 1997);
Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1259 (11th Cir. 2000).
19. Nussle v. Willette, 224 F.3d 95 (2nd Cir. 2000), rev’d, Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983
(2002).
20. Booth, 206 F.3d 289 (3rd Cir. 2000), aff’d, 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
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relevant because the primary issue before the Third Circuit was whether
excessive force should be considered a “prison condition” for purposes of the
PLRA. Booth is also interesting because upon being granted certiorari, the
United States Supreme Court’s ruling on the case was centered on an analysis
of the PLRA phrase “administrative remedies. . .available.”21 The Court
completely ignored the Third Circuit’s exhaustive efforts to categorize
excessive force as a prison condition.22
Timothy Booth, a prisoner in the Pennsylvania State Correctional Institute
at Smithfield, initiated his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.23 The District Court
dismissed the case because Booth had failed to exhaust his administrative
remedies as required by 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).24 On appeal, Booth made three
arguments that § 1997e(a) did not control. First, he asserted that “prison
conditions” could not be read to include a prison official’s intentional act of
violence. Second, there was nothing in the legislative history of the PLRA that
would indicate that an act of excessive force should be considered a “prison
condition,” and third, that the Supreme Court had made a distinction between
excessive force actions which require an intentional act of violence and
conditions-of-confinement actions which do not.25
The Third Circuit, holding that excessive force was a “prison condition”,
recognized that “prison conditions” was not defined in § 1997e(a), however,
the definition could be located in another section of the PLRA, § 3626(g)(2).
That section defines the term “civil action with respect to prison conditions” as
“any civil proceeding arising under Federal law with respect to the conditions
of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of
persons confined in prison, but does not include habeas corpus proceedings
challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison.”26

The court, in referring to the Supreme Court case Sullivan v. Stroop,
commented “[t]he substantial relation between the two [provisions in the
21. Booth, 532 U.S. 731 (2001).
22. Id.
23. Booth, 206 F.3d at 292. Booth alleged that various prison officials punched him in the
mouth, shoved him into a shelf and a door, threw a cleaning material in his face, and bruised his
wrists from over-tightening handcuffs. Id. Booth believed that his Eighth Amendment right to be
free of cruel and unusual punishment was violated, thus he filed his claim for an injunction and
money damages in the District Court. Booth subsequently filed additional petitions requesting
more injunctions, money damages and protective orders for transfer to another prison. Id. at 291.
Booth also requested an order to improve the prison law library, to hire a paralegal for himself
and to fine prison officials for contempt of court. Id. at 292.
24. Id. at 293. The court observed that the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections had
established a three-step grievance procedure and that Booth had only satisfied the first step prior
to bringing his claim to federal court. Id. at 202.
25. Id. at 294.
26. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) (2000) (emphasis added).
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PLRA] presents a classic case for application of the normal rule of statutory
construction that identical words used in different parts of the same act are
intended to have the same meaning.”27
The Third Circuit described its analysis of § 3626(g)(2) as one of common
sense, holding that the term “conditions of confinement” consists of actions
relating to “the environment in which prisoners live, the physical conditions of
that environment, and the nature of the services provided therein.”28 The court
held that a claim of excessive force does fall under the term “the effects of
actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison.”
Actions ranging from excessive force to not making basic prison repairs or
intentionally denying a prisoner his basic right to food, heat or medical
attention affect the lives of each prisoner similarly by making their lives
worse.29
The Third Circuit also supported its holding with the Supreme Court’s
analysis from another case concerning prison litigation.30 The Supreme Court,
basing its decision on reading the statute in its entirety, held that the term
“conditions of confinement” from § 636(b)(1)(B) included continuous prison
conditions and isolated acts by prison officials.31 The Booth Court reasoned
that an excessive force claim would be considered an isolated act of
unconstitutional conduct, thus falling within the definition of a “condition of
confinement.”
Judge Noonan began his dissent, “The crux of the case is what Congress
meant by the statutory term ‘prison conditions.”32 In arguing that excessive
force was not a prison condition, Judge Noonan relied upon the Webster’s
Dictionary definition of the word “conditions.”33 He stated that the relevant
definition was an “existing state of affairs” or “something needing remedy.”
He then proceeded to define “prison conditions” as “a state of affairs in a
prison” or “something needing remedy in a prison.”34 Judge Noonan argued
27. Booth, 206 F.3d at 294.
28. Id. Cell overcrowding, poor prison construction and inadequate facilities would be
considered “conditions of confinement.” Id.
29. Id. at 295.
30. McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136 (1991). In McCarthy, a prisoner claimed that prison
officials had used excessive force when moving him to another cell. Id. at 138. The prisoner
alleged that § 636(b)(1)(B) allowed nonconsensual referral to a magistrate only when a prisoner
challenges ongoing prison conditions. Id. McCarthy claimed that isolated, unconstitutional acts
by prison officials are not “conditions of confinement.” Id. at 139. The term “conditions of
confinement,” he asserted, referred to continuous conditions and not isolated incidents. Id. 13839.
31. Id. at 142.
32. Booth, 206 F.3d at 300 (Noonan, J., dissenting).
33. Id. at 300-01.
34. Id.
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that the physical beating Booth took was not a prison condition or state of
affairs, but a single act that could not possibly affect the prison population as a
whole.
On being granted certiorari, the United States Supreme Court, in
unanimously affirming the appeals court, declared, “The meaning of the phrase
‘administrative remedies. . .available’ is the crux of the case.”35 The Court
completely ignored the issue of “prison conditions.” Instead, the Court’s
analysis centered on whether or not Pennsylvania had an administrative
process in place that could provide Booth with an adequate remedy. In lieu of
referring to a dictionary to define “prison conditions,” the Court relied upon
the statutory requirement that the prisoner must exhaust all available
administrative remedies before taking his claim to federal court.36 The Court
also supported its decision by noting that § 1997e(a) was amended by
Congress to remove the court’s discretion to require exhaustion of
administrative remedies. The Court held that Congress made its intent very
clear by making the exhaustion requirement mandatory.37
2. Sixth Circuit
Prior to Booth, the Sixth Circuit addressed the issue of excessive force as a
prison condition. In Freeman v. Francis the Sixth Circuit held that a prisoner’s
claim of excessive force was a “prison condition,” resulting in mandatory
exhaustion of available administrative remedies.38
Recognizing that the term “prison conditions” was not defined in §
1997e(a), the court turned to the rule of statutory construction described above
in Booth. The court applied that reasoning to hold that the definition of “prison
conditions” in § 3626(g)(2), “. . .conditions of confinement or the effects of
actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison. . .,”
applies to § 1997e(a).39 The court also held that the legislative history
indicated Congressional intent to create a broad exhaustion requirement that
encompassed claims of excessive force.40 The Sixth Circuit believed that a
claim of excessive force should follow proper administrative grievance
procedures like any other inmate complaint so that the prison can take

35. Booth, 532 U.S. at 732 (2001).
36. Id. at 740.
37. Id.
38. Freeman v. Francis, 196 F.3d 641 (6th Cir. 1999). Freeman concerned an inmate at a
prison hospital. Freeman alleged that a guard assaulted him after he had requested medical
attention from a nurse. Id. at 642-43. Freeman also claimed that he suffered a separated shoulder
and sued the hospital staff and the guard for damages. Id. at 643.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 644 (determining that the PLRA was enacted to reduce frivolous lawsuits by
prisoners and to prevent the judicial system from micromanaging the nation’s prison systems).
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immediate corrective action if a problem truly exists.41 The court also briefly
referred to the Supreme Court’s holding in McCarthy v. Bronson to find that a
prisoner’s claim of excessive force should be considered a “condition of
confinement.”42
3. Seventh Circuit
The Seventh Circuit held in Smith v. Zachary, that excessive force was to
be considered a prison condition for purposes of the PLRA.43 The court based
its decision upon the rule of statutory construction and the legislative intent
behind the enactment of the PLRA.
The Seventh Circuit began its analysis by recognizing that § 1997e(a) did
not define the term “prison conditions,” however, a definition could be found
in § 3626(g)(2).
The court remarked, “the words of a statute must be read in their context
and with a view to their place in the overall statutory scheme. Thus, the
meaning of a statute may be affected by a related act, especially if that act
provides greater specificity on the issue at hand.”44 The court found both
sections (1) concerned prison litigation, (2) were multi-issue acts, (3) were
designed to specifically address inmate issues, and (4) both were part of the
same legislation with the similar objectives of encouraging prisons to handle
inmate grievances internally and reducing the court’s attempts to micromanage
the prison system.45 The court’s statutory construction analysis mirrored that
of the Booth and Freeman courts to find that a claim of excessive force comes
within the § 3626(g)(2) definition of “prison conditions.” The court supported
its finding by stating that Smith’s assault claim met the second half definition
of “prison condition” in § 3626(g)(2) because he was affected by an action, the
assault, by government officials, the guards.46

41. Id.
42. Id. McCarthy held that inmate claims challenging conditions of confinement include
ongoing prison conditions and specific acts of unconstitutional conduct by prison officials. Id.
43. Smith, 255 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2001). Inmate Smith alleged that he had been assaulted by
prison guards in retaliation for his participation in a prison riot. Id. at 453. He claimed to have
been beaten in the face, buttocks and groin. Id. Then Smith claimed that he was handcuffed,
beaten again and placed in a prison shower unit where he was hit and jabbed with batons. Id.
Smith also alleged the guards then stripped him naked and continued to beat him over an
unspecified period of time. Id. Finally, Smith claimed he was denied medical treatment for the
injuries until one week later. Id. He failed to follow an established administrative review process
for prisoner complaints. Id. at 448. He also failed to follow the administrative review process in
appeal to the warden’s response. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 449.
46. Id.
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The Seventh Circuit then proceeded to determine the plain-meaning of the
term “prison conditions” in § 1997e(a). Smith argued that by applying the
plain-meaning rule to the term “prison conditions” one could only conclude
that the word “conditions” does not include a single, isolated event. The court
concluded that congressional intent of the word “conditions” was to include a
single, isolated event by referring to the opening section of the United States
Code of which § 1997e(a) is a part.47
Based upon its analysis of the legislative history, the Seventh Circuit
concluded that Congress intended to broaden the administrative remedy
exhaustion requirement to include all federal claims. The court determined
that Congress broadened the exhaustion requirement of § 1997e(a) in three
ways: (1) by requiring mandatory exhaustion rather than giving the court
discretion, (2) by not limiting the requirement to only § 1983 claims, and (3)
by eliminating the restriction that exhaustion was required only if the prison
had an effective means of administrative review.48
Smith argued that Congress intended to exclude claims of excessive force
from having to meet the exhaustion requirement. In rejecting this argument,
the court noted that the PLRA contained an exclusion only for habeas corpus
proceedings and that Congress would have enumerated claims of excessive
force as an exclusion had it intended to exempt them.49
Dissenting, Judge Williams argued that the alleged beatings Smith took did
not meet the plain-meaning of “prison conditions” under § 1997e(a) or the
definition of “prison conditions” in § 3626(g)(2).50 Judge Williams believed
the majority altered the language of § 1997e(a) to achieve their perception of
the Congressional intent. He argued that it was the court’s duty to apply the
statute as Congress had written, not to mold the language to create a statute
that Congress did not intend.51
Judge Williams also referred to the Webster’s Dictionary definition of
“conditions.” He argued that “conditions” as “attendant circumstances” or
“existing state of affairs” refer to the environment or surroundings in which
one lived and “conditions” would require that something occur routinely or
with regularity.52 He was unable to determine how an isolated, violent assault
would fit into this definition of “conditions.” Judge Williams also declared
47. Id. The Code states: “In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, unless the
context indicates otherwise. . .words importing the plural include the singular.” Id.
48. Id. at 451.
49. Id. (quoting 2A SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23) (“The general rule
of statutory construction is that the enumeration of specific exclusions from the operation of a
statute should apply to all cases not specifically excluded.”).
50. Smith, 255 F.3d at 454 (Williams, J., dissenting).
51. Id.
52. Id. at 453-54.
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that excessive force claims do not fit within the second half of the “prison
conditions” definition of § 3626(g)(2). He argued that the language of that
section addresses claims only relating to the effects of actions. He believed
that claims of excessive force were related to actions, not to claims related to
effects.53 Judge Williams concluded that since Congress did not explicitly
write into the statute that claims of excessive force were to be considered a
“prison condition,” the court was not justified to accomplish something they
perceived was Congress’ intent.54
B.

Circuits Finding Excessive Force to not be a Prison Condition
1. Second Circuit

The Second Circuit stands alone in its determination that claims of
excessive force are not “prison conditions” for purposes of the PLRA. In
Nussle v. Willette, the court, in noting that the issue was a matter of first
impression, held that the exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement
under § 1997e(a) did not apply to claims of excessive force.55 The Second
Circuit analyzed the statutory text of § 1997e(a), the relationship between §
1997e(a) and § 3626(g)(2) and the structure, purpose and legislative history of
the PLRA.56 Nussle alleged that prison guards violated his Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendment rights to be free from cruel and unusual punishment
and his Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process.57 The District
Court dismissed the case because Nussle failed to exhaust the available
administrative remedies as required by the PLRA.
The Second Circuit found the term “prison conditions” to be ambiguous.
The court noted that the term was not defined anywhere in § 1997 so a reading
of Webster’s Dictionary was required. The court proceeded to apply the
reasoning in the Booth dissent to find that a particular violent incident is not
encompassed by the term “prison conditions.”58
Next, the court proceeded to examine the relationship between 42 U.S.C. §
1997e(a) and 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2). The court found the definition of
“prison conditions” in § 3626(g)(2) to be just as ambiguous as the text in §
53. Id. at 454-55.
54. Id. at 455.
55. Nussle, 224 F.3d 95 (2nd Cir. 2000), rev’d, Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983 (2002).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 97. Nussle alleged that guards beat him without provocation or justification. Id.
Nussle also claimed the guards beat him so much that he lost control of his bowels and that the
guards threatened to kill him if he reported the incident. Id.
58. Id. at 101. The court found the term “conditions” meant “attendant circumstances” or an
“existing state of affairs.” Id. The term “prison conditions” would refer to circumstances
affecting everyone in the area affected by them rather than a single momentary beating. Id.
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1997e(a).59 The court decided the § 3626(g)(2) definition only applied to itself
and not to § 1997e(a). The Second Circuit then analyzed the definition of
“prison conditions” from § 3626(g)(2). Like most courts, the Second Circuit
found the first half of the definition, “conditions of confinement” to not
encompass claims of excessive force. In examining the second half of the
definition, “the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of
persons confined in prison,” the court declared that such language would never
be used to describe an isolated incident of assault.60
Because the Second Circuit found the text of § 1997e(a) and § 3626(g)(2)
to be ambiguous, it looked to the structure and purpose of the PLRA as a
whole, the legislative history of the PLRA, and the legal context for direction
in determining the meaning of “prison conditions.”61 The court first turned its
attention to § 3626(g)(2) to determine whether or not this section should
actually be read to provide a definition of “prison conditions” for § 1997e(a),
as many courts have so held. The court found that the purpose of § 1997e(a)
was to discourage and eliminate frivolous lawsuits by inmates before they got
to federal court and the purpose of § 3626(g)(2) was to prohibit liberal Federal
judges from micromanaging the prison system.62 The Second Circuit also
analyzed the term “government officials” from the second part of the definition
of “prison conditions” from § 3626(g)(2).63 The term “government officials”,
the court reasoned, would include administrative or policymaking employees,
rather than the guards, having daily contact with the inmates, who would not
have administrative authority.64 The court held that importing the definition of
“prison conditions” from§ 3626(g)(2) into § 1997e(a), would be to ignore the
context and statutory purposes the two sections advanced.65
The Second Circuit also concluded that the legislative history of the PLRA
demonstrated that the definition of “prison conditions,” as used in §
3626(g)(2), was not meant to be imported into § 1997e(a). The court found the
59. Id. at 102.
60. Id. at 102-03 (referring to the Booth dissent in which Judge Noonan argued that if a
guard hit a prisoner in the mouth, it would be highly unlikely that the prisoner would say, “A
government official has taken an action having an effect on my life”).
61. Id. at 103-07.
62. Id. at 103-04.
63. Id. at 105( holding that “it stretched that provision’s definition too far to characterize
lower level government employees, such as corrections officers, as ‘government officials,’ since
such a reading of the term ‘officials’ would include just about any government employee without
regard to level of responsibility or authority).
64. Id. at 104. The court supported this reasoning by referring to the term “official,” used in
section § 3626(a)(3)(F) (That section reads: “Any State or local official [whose] jurisdiction or
function “[includes the appropriation of funds for the construction, operation, or maintenance of
prison facilities, or the prosecution or custody of persons. . . .”] Id.
65. Id. at 105.
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sponsors of the PLRA intended to divide the bill into two sets of provisions.66
The first being those directed at reducing frivolous lawsuits and the second
being those that would prevent the micromanagement of prison systems by
federal judges.67 Based upon the court’s analysis of the statutory purpose and
context, the court determined that isolated incidents of assault were not to be
considered as falling under § 3626(g)(2). The court found no reason to apply
the definition of “prison conditions” in § 3626(g)(2) to claims of excessive
force, especially if those claims do not pertain to the effects on prisoners from
judicial micromanagement.
IV. ANALYSIS: EXCESSIVE FORCE AS A “PRISON CONDITION”
A.

Statutory Text
1. Analysis of the plain meaning of § 1997e(a)

To ascertain the plain meaning of a statute, the particular statutory
language at issue must be examined, as well as the language and design of the
statute as a whole.68 Although the term “prison conditions” is not defined in
section 1997, one can apply a common sense approach to realize that excessive
force used by a prison official to control an inmate is a “prison condition” for
purposes of the PLRA.
Physical force used by guards upon inmates takes place everyday in
America’s prison systems. Violence is a way of life for inmates and guards
alike. While the majority of these acts are probably justified to contain a
violent prisoner, there are times when guards exceed their bounds and violate
the prisoner’s constitutional right to be free from cruel and unusual
punishment. These actions may occur as single or momentary matters but they
affect the entire prison population.
Because not all prisons are managed as model correctional institutions,
excessive force by prison officials may be considered a living condition of
prison life at certain facilities. Extreme physical acts of force upon inmates
would be considered a circumstance of that prison society. As such, the act of
excessive force could be a by-product of systemic problems, including poor
hiring and training procedures or inadequate procedures for responding to
insubordinate or violent behavior by inmates.69

66. Id.
67. Id. The court supported this conclusion by noting floor statements that the court said
“suggest that the concern over “frivolous” suits in this context refers to subject matter, rather than
to the factual merits of a claim, that, if proven, would be meritorious.” Id.
68. K Mart v. Cartier, Inc. 486 U.S. 281, 291 (1988).
69. Smith, 255 F.3d at 459.
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Acts of excessive force by prison officials may be made possible by the
prison environment itself, thus the remedy lies in addressing the prison
conditions that facilitate these acts at the source. While screening out frivolous
lawsuits was a driving force behind enacting the PLRA, one mandate of the
PLRA was to exhaust all available administrative remedies.70 The exhaustion
requirement is the most efficient means of alerting the prison system that a
problem exists. The administrative grievance process provides prompt notice
to prison officials, while a lawsuit could take years before a court makes a
decision. Requiring the prisoner to follow administrative grievance procedures
affords prison officials the opportunity to address the situation internally. In
the case of excessive force claims, prison officials can take immediate action,
such as firing the guards responsible for the acts, implementing training
procedures or providing additional supervision of staff. Any of these actions
taken by the prison will affect, hopefully improving, the living conditions of
the entire prison population.
2. Canon of Statutory Construction
At dispute is whether or not the definition of “prison conditions” found in
18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) can be applied to PLRA claims of excessive force.
Since 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) does not define “prison conditions”, those courts
ruling in favor of administrative exhaustion have relied upon the rule of
statutory construction to hold that the definition of “prison conditions” from §
3626(g)(2) can be used in PLRA litigation. The rule of statutory construction
can be applied when a substantial relationship exists between two sections of
legislation.71 The rule states that when identical words are used in different
parts of related legislation, the words are intended to have the same meaning.72
Sections 3626 and 1997e are substantially related. Both sections were part
of the same legislation and each concern inmate issues and prison litigation.
Section 3626 provides inmates with a means of remedy for any civil action
with respect to prison conditions. It details the requirements of prospective
relief and preliminary injunctive relief and also the termination of prospective
relief. Section 3626(g)(2) defines the term “civil action with respect to prison
condition” as any civil proceeding arising under Federal law with respect to the
conditions of confinement or the effects of actions by government officials on
the lives of persons confined in prison, but does not include habeas corpus
proceedings challenging the fact or duration of confinement in prison.73
Section 1997e concerns Federal suits by inmates with respect to prison

70.
71.
72.
73.

141 CONG. REC. S7498-01, S7527 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478, 484 (1990).
Id.
18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) (2000).
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conditions. It requires that prisoners exhaust all administrative grievance
procedures prior to initiating a Federal claim if the claim relates to prison
conditions. Since both sections are primarily concerned with violations of
prison conditions, it is clear the sections are substantially related and the rule
of statutory construction can be applied.
The next issue is whether or not the definition of “prison conditions” from
§ 3626(g)(2) is an appropriate fit for § 1997e(a). The first half of the definition
in § 3626(g)(2), “conditions of confinement” can include claims of excessive
force with respect to the PLRA. Prior to the enactment of the PLRA, the
Supreme Court held that an inmate’s suit challenging conditions of
confinement, included claims involving isolated incidents of unconstitutional
conduct as well as challenges to ongoing prison conditions.74 Based upon the
Supreme Court’s ruling in McCarthy, a claim of excessive force should be
considered a “condition of confinement.” The use of excessive force by prison
officials on an inmate is an isolated incident of unconstitutional conduct as far
as that inmate is concerned. It can also be representative of an ongoing prison
condition if excessive force is routinely used by the same officials within the
same prison system.
The second half of the definition in § 3626(g)(2), “the effects of actions by
government officials on the lives of persons confined in prison” is perhaps an
even better fit for § 1997e(a). Clearly, a dictionary is not required to interpret
this part of the definition of “prison conditions.” The use of excessive force
upon an inmate is an “action.” A prison guard employed at a state or federal
penitentiary should be considered a government official. The guard’s
supervisors, prison administrative personnel and any other prison employees
responsible for inmate security or inmate care should also be considered a
government official. The act of excessive force by a government official upon
an inmate will have an immediate and possible long-term physical and mental
affect on that inmate. The use of excessive force could also be indicative of
conditions of poor hiring practices, lack of training or insufficient supervision
of prison officials responsible for inmate security. All of these conditions
affect the prison environment as a whole.
B.

Legislative History

The limited legislative history of the PLRA indicates that Congress
intended claims of excessive force to be subject to the exhaustion requirement
of § 1997e(a). Senators Dole, Hatch and Kyl introduced the PLRA in 1995.
Senator Dole noted the drastic increase in prisoner litigation and the

74. McCarthy, 500 U.S. 136.
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detrimental effects it was having on the judicial system.75 The initial draft of
the PLRA applied only to civil rights violations under § 1983 and allowed for
judicial discretion concerning the exhaustion of administrative remedies.76
The goal of the PLRA was not only to limit frivolous lawsuits by prisoners, but
to also deter courts from micromanaging America’s prisons.77 Section
1997e(a) was eventually amended to require mandatory, rather than
discretionary, exhaustion of administrative remedies and applied to all federal
claims, not just § 1983 suits.78
Congress did not enumerate a claim of excessive force, or any other
specific claim, as exclusions to § 1997e(a). In fact, there is no record
indicating any congressional intent to exclude claims of excessive force from
the PLRA. Also, there is no legislative history indicating any distinctions
between excessive force claims and “prison conditions” claims. Congress
allowed for a broad exhaustion requirement to ensnare all varieties of frivolous
inmate suits. Congress would have defeated the purpose of a broad exhaustion
requirement by shielding certain types of claims from the PLRA’s reach.
While most of the legislative comments concern frivolous suits that seem
ludicrous, it was realized that all inmate suits, even claims of excessive force,
have the potential to be frivolous and overburden the judicial system. The
burden these lawsuits presented to the courts was supported by statistical
evidence. The cited statistical studies did not distinguish between conditions
of confinement actions and excessive force actions.79 The requirement of
subjecting the claim to the administrative grievance process does not prevent
the inmate from eventually filing suit. The broad exhaustion requirement
merely serves to weed out those claims of excessive force that are frivolous
and to provide prison officials the opportunity to correct a system failure when
the claim is valid.
There was limited resistance to the enactment of the PLRA.80 The
opponent’s main objection to the PLRA was that it would frustrate meritorious
75. 141 CONG. REC. S7498-01, S7525 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Dole).
“Over the past two decades, we have witnessed an alarming explosion in the number of lawsuits
filed by State and Federal prisoners.” Id. “Frivolous lawsuits filed by prisoners tie up the courts,
waste valuable judicial and legal resources, and affect the quality of justice enjoyed by the lawabiding population.” Id.
76. 141 CONG. REC. S7498-01, S7526 (daily ed. May 25, 1995) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
77. 141 CONG. REC. S14408-01, S14418 (daily ed. Sep. 27, 1995) (statement of Sen. Hatch).
“While prison conditions that actually violate the Constitution should not be allowed to persist, I
believe that the courts have gone too far in micromanaging our Nation’s prisons.” Id.
78. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (Supp. 2001).
79. ABRAHAM, supra note 5.
80. 142 CONG. REC. S2285-02, S2297 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen.
Kennedy). “I do not intend to offer an amendment to this bill, because it is clear that a majority of
the Senate would not vote to strike the provision, and I do not believe the Senate is positioned to
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claims.81 In passing the PLRA, Congress did not eliminate the court’s ability
to remedy a constitutional violation of an inmate’s civil rights. Congress
merely took steps that would ensure only those claims with merit would be
heard by processing the inmate’s claim through the administrative grievance
chain.
C. Analysis of the Supreme Court’s Ruling on Nussle v. Willette
The Second Circuit, ruling in Nussle v. Willette, held that excessive force
was not a “prison condition” and thus not subject to the exhaustion
requirement of the PLRA.82 The Supreme Court resolved the Circuit split by
unanimously reversing the Second Circuit. The Court, in siding with the
majority of the Circuits, held that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies
to all prisoner suits about prison life, whether they involve general
circumstances or particular episodes, and whether they allege an Eighth
Amendment violation based upon the use of excessive force or some other
wrong.83 The Supreme Court’s decision was not limited to claims of excessive
force. The Court made it clear that all prisoner suits must proceed through the
administrative grievance process. No shortcuts to federal court are to be
allowed.
To determine the meaning of the term “prison condition,” the Supreme
Court relied on the text and purpose of the PLRA, Court precedent, and the
weight of lower court rulings.84 The Court also noted that the Second Circuit
might have reached the opposite decision had the opinion of a unanimous
Supreme Court in Booth v. Churner, decided almost one year later, been
available.85
In its analysis of the legislative intent and text of the PLRA, the Court
recognized that all available remedies must be exhausted, even if the relief
sought is not available through grievance proceedings. The Court stated that
the legislative intent of § 1997e(a) was to reduce the quantity and increase the

consider detailed improvements to the PLRA during debate on this omnibus appropriations bill.
But the abbreviated nature of the legislative process should not suggest that the proposal is
noncontroversial in Congress.” Id.
81. 142 CONG. REC. S2285-02, S2297 (daily ed. Mar. 19, 1996) (statement of Sen. Simon).
“In attempting to curtail frivolous prisoner lawsuits, this legislation goes much too far, and
instead may make it impossible for the Federal courts to remedy constitutional and statutory
violations in prisons, jails and juvenile detention facilities.” Id. “In seeking to curtail frivolous
lawsuits, we cannot deprive individuals of their basic civil rights.” Id.
82. Nussle, 224 F.3d 95 (2nd Cir. 2000), rev’d, Porter v. Nussle, 122 S. Ct. 983 (2002).
83. Porter, 122 S. Ct. 983, 992 (2002).
84. Id. at 986.
85. Id. at 988.
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quality of inmate suits.86 The Court determined that attempting to resolve the
prisoner’s claim through the internal prison grievance process might actually
improve prison administration and satisfy the inmate, such that there would be
no need for litigation.87 The process would filter out frivolous claims and
create an administrative record that more accurately describes the issues
involved in the claim.88
The Court also noted that the title of a statue and the heading of a section
can be used for the resolution of a doubt about the meaning of a statute.89
Here, § 1997e is titled “Suits by prisoners.” The Court reasoned that based
upon this title, Congress did not intend to segregate excessive force claims
from the universe of inmate suits.90 The Court held that it seemed unlikely that
Congress, after including a mandatory exhaustion requirement in the PLRA,
would allow a prisoner to plead an excessive force claim and then allow him
the option of administratively exhausting the claim.91
The Supreme Court’s analysis of the congressional intent of the PLRA was
correct. As noted above, Congress did not specifically define “prison
conditions” in section 1997. Congress also made no mention to exclude claims
of excessive force from § 1997e(a). In fact, there are no enumerated
exclusions to § 1997e(a). There is also no evidence indicating that Congress
provided an avenue for prisoners to bypass the exhaustion requirement by
filing a claim of excessive force. Congress intended that any occurrence in
prison is a condition of that environment, thus any suit by an inmate relating to
the inmate’s existence within the prison system is subject to the PLRA. In
Booth, the Court made note of the congressional intent to broaden the
exhaustion requirement.92 The Supreme Court recognized that the intent of
Congress was to create a statute that would deter frivolous lawsuits by
requiring inmates to exhaust the administrative grievance process regardless of
the claim. Thus, whether the suit is for excessive force or for being served the
wrong type of peanut butter, the claim must proceed through the administrative
grievance system first.
A large part of the Second Circuit’s opinion was devoted to an analysis of
the relationship between 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
The Second Circuit held that the second part of the definition of “prison
conditions” from § 3626(g)(2) is ambiguous and applies only to itself, while a
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 990.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Booth, 532 U.S. at 740 (2001). The Court commented, “ . . .we think that Congress has
mandated exhaustion clearly enough. . .” Id.
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majority of other Circuits have held otherwise.93 The Supreme Court did not
issue an opinion on the reading of § 3626(g)(2) and whether or not it could be
applied to § 1997e(a). The Court held that the canon of statutory construction
was not required since Congress had clearly implemented a general rule of
exhaustion within the PLRA.94
In addition to examining the legislative intent and text of the PLRA, the
Supreme Court also relied upon its analysis in McCarthy v. Bronson.95
McCarthy involved a suit by a prisoner alleging his rights had been violated as
a result of prison officials using excessive force upon him.96 The petitioner in
McCarthy argued that an unconstitutional, isolated act of violence against a
prisoner should not be classified as an ongoing prison condition.97 The Court
determined that the statutory phrase “challenging conditions of confinement”
must be viewed in its proper context and not in isolation and that a broad
reading of the statute was necessary to comport with the legislative intent
behind the statute.98 The Supreme Court held that prisoner suits challenging
“conditions of confinement” when read in context, authorized suits involving
isolated incidents of unconstitutional conduct as well as challenges to ongoing
prison conditions.
In Nussle, the Supreme Court again read the statutory term at issue not in
isolation but in its proper context. Based on the congressional intent to
promote administrative remedies, filter out frivolous claims and to create
improved claims for litigation, the Court held that inmate suits alleging the use
of excessive force, whether just once or many times, could only be classified as
a “prison condition.”99 Perhaps more importantly, the Court noted the folly of
Nussle’s isolated incident argument. The Court asked why a prisoner should
be able to bypass the administrative grievance process when he has been
assaulted on only one occasion, but not when the beatings are widespread and
routine, as Nussle alleged would be indicative of an on going prison
condition.100
V. CONCLUSION
93. 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(2) (2000). The second part of the “prison conditions” definition
reads: “. . .the effects of actions by government officials on the lives of persons confined in
prison. . .” Id.
94. Porter, 122 S. Ct. 983, 988 (2002).
95. Id. at 989.
96. McCarthy, 500 U.S. 136 (1991). The case involved the interpretation the term
“conditions of confinement” under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
97. Id. at 138-39.
98. Id. at 139-42 (holding that the Court must look to the statutory language at issue, as well
as the language and design of the statute as a whole).
99. Porter, 122 S. Ct. 983, 990.
100. Id. at 991-92.
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Congress created the PLRA to curb the escalating number of frivolous
lawsuits by prisoners and to prevent Federal judges from micromanaging the
nation’s prison systems. Originally, the Act only applied to 42 U.S.C. § 1983
claims and gave the courts discretion to require an inmate to exhaust
administrative remedies prior to taking the claim to court. The PLRA was
eventually amended to encompass all federal claims by prisoners and made the
exhaustion requirement mandatory. It is apparent from the legislative history
that Congress intended all inmate claims to be subjected to the exhaustion
requirement. Congress reasoned that inmate suits should be resolved at the
administrative hearing level and that if the prisoner was still not satisfied with
the results after exhausting all available administrative remedies, at least a
better record of the complaint would already be developed prior to the suit
reaching federal court.
The PLRA does not enumerate a claim of excessive force as an exclusion
to the exhaustion requirement. Congress realized that any prisoner complaint
might be frivolous so the PLRA was drafted without exclusions. Congress also
reasoned that by utilizing the administrative grievance process, prison officials
could take immediate action should a problem actually exist within the prison
system. Processing a claim of excessive force through the administrative
grievance process will allow prison officials to resolve the matter in a more
effective manner by either immediately removing the offending guards, adding
more supervisors or by changing an internal process or procedure.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Porter v. Nussle has effectively slammed
the door shut on inmates trying to shortcut the exhaustion requirement of the
PLRA. The Porter holding will have broad implications on prisoner litigation.
The Court not only held that a claim of excessive force is a prison condition for
purposes of the PLRA, but the holding also made it perfectly clear that any suit
brought by a prisoner relating to prison life, whether an isolated incident or
systemic, must be carried through the administrative grievance process before
moving to federal court. As a result of Porter, the PLRA goal to reduce inmate
litigation in federal courts can finally be realized. Ultimately, the inmate,
America’s judicial and prison systems, and taxpayers will benefit as a result of
the Supreme Court’s holding in Porter.
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